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On St. Patrick’s Day 2011, Representative Louise Slaughter of New 
York introduced a bill that she had introduced three times before.1 Along 
with Representative Tim Waltz of Minnesota, Representative Slaughter 
introduced the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act 
for consideration by the U.S. House of Representatives.2 The STOCK Act 
explicitly prohibits members of Congress and their staff from trading on 
material, nonpublic information received because of their congressional 
status.3 
No more than thirteen members of the House had cosponsored each 
prior introduction of the bill.4 The 2011 version of the bill was keeping 
 
1 President Obama Praises Slaughter for Her Work to End Insider Trading in Congress as He 
Signs STOCK Act into Law, CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER (Apr. 4, 2012), 
http://louise.house.gov/press-releases/president-obama-praises-slaughter-for-her-work-to-end-insider-
trading-in-congress-as-he-signs-stock-act-into-law/. 
2 H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011). 
3 President Obama Praises Slaughter, supra note 1. As enacted, the STOCK Act required 
disclosure of staff and members’ stock or commodity transactions that exceed $1000. Id. In the spring 
of 2013, however, Congress passed and the President signed a bill stripping the STOCK Act of its 
online disclosure requirement as it pertains to congressional staff and Executive Branch employees. The 
move followed the release of a National Academy of Public Administration report claiming that a 
searchable disclosure database of congressional and agency employee trading poses a risk to national 
security, among other things. See Eric Yoder, Federal Employee Financial Disclosures to Remain 
Offline, WASH. POST FED. EYE BLOG (Apr. 15, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
federal-eye/wp/2013/04/15/federal-employee-financial-disclosures-to-remain-offline/. 
4 President Obama Praises Slaughter, supra note 1. 
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pace with its predecessors’ cosponsor count until November 13th, when 60 
Minutes aired a segment about the trading activities of members of 
Congress, including House Speaker John Boehner, House Financial 
Services Committee Chairman Spencer Bachus, and Minority Leader 
Nancy Pelosi.5 The following day, the list of STOCK Act cosponsors more 
than doubled.6 By the end of the week, ninety-two members of the U.S. 
House of Representatives had signed on to the bill, and within three 
months, 286 members of the House, representing both parties, had 
cosponsored the STOCK Act.7 Shortly thereafter, the Senate took up the 
measure, and in a rare turn of bipartisanship and efficiency for the 112th 
Congress,8 the two houses passed the STOCK Act in March 2012.9 
President Obama signed the bill the following month.10 Call it the power of 
the media, an ethically reinvigorated Congress, or even the will of the 
people, but the newly enacted STOCK Act promised consequences for 
corrupt members of Congress. 
The Act’s passage was timely. Just months before, members of 
Congress had been reassured that they would enjoy a more expansive 
interpretation of legislative privilege in the D.C. Circuit than at any other 
point in American history.11 Legislative privilege, which derives from the 
Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution,12 allows members of 
Congress to withhold certain information pertaining to legislative acts that 
could otherwise be used against them in a court of law.13 In 2007, the D.C. 
Circuit applied the broad and previously unrecognized legislative privilege 
of evidentiary nondisclosure in the case of United States v. Rayburn House 
 
5 60 Minutes: Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information? (CBS television broadcast Nov. 13, 
2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-57323527/congress-trading-stock-on-
inside-information/; see Carl Hulse, Lawmakers Look to Rein in Their Investing, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS 
(Nov. 28, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/lawmakers-look-to-rein-in-
trading/. 
6 See Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012): H.R. 1148 Cosponsors, THOMAS 
(LIBR. OF CONGRESS), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR01148:@@@P (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2014). 
7 Id. Boehner, Pelosi, and Bachus were not among the 286 cosponsors. See id. 
8 For commentary on the perceived failures of the 112th Congress, see Ezra Klein, 14 Reasons Why 
This Is the Worst Congress Ever, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (July 13, 2012, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-why-this-is-the-worst-
congress-ever/. 
9 Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012): S.2038 Major Congressional Actions, 
THOMAS (LIBR. OF CONGRESS), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN02038:@@@R (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2014); see also Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-105, 126 Stat. 291. 
10 See STOCK Act § 19, 126 Stat. at 305. 
11 See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
13 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951). 
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Office Building.14 Prior to Rayburn, legislative privilege was largely 
understood as a testimonial privilege so members of Congress did not have 
to testify about their involvement in legislative acts; the privilege did not 
include the privilege of nondisclosure—the privilege to withhold 
documents sought under a lawful warrant.15 The Supreme Court denied the 
Government’s petition for certiorari in Rayburn,16 and the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding in Rayburn changed the scope of legislative privilege by permitting 
members of Congress to withhold information even in the face of a valid 
warrant.17 
Only two months before the passage of the STOCK Act, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari in a case from the Ninth Circuit, United States v. 
Renzi, that if affirmed by the Court could have threatened the new, broad 
privilege recently granted in Rayburn.18 In Renzi, the Ninth Circuit denied 
former Representative Richard Renzi’s claim that legislative privilege 
included the privilege of nondisclosure.19 By denying Renzi’s petition, the 
Supreme Court declined to consider the first viable, post-Rayburn 
challenge to the legislative privilege of nondisclosure. In other words, two 
months prior to passage of the STOCK Act, the D.C. Circuit’s 
unprecedented interpretation of legislative privilege no longer faced any 
outside threats, and nondisclosure as part of legislative privilege was here 
to stay. 
The question then remains: what happens when congressional 
members’ expanded legislative privilege to withhold documents sought by 
prosecutors collides with Congress’s own directive to the Executive Branch 
to prosecute members for insider trading? This Note explores the post-
Rayburn tension between the Executive’s enforcement of the STOCK Act 
and Congress’s legislative privilege. Hampered by the expansive definition 
of legislative privilege in Rayburn, the Executive Branch may face 
prohibitive barriers to uncovering evidence of an exchange of material, 
nonpublic information between, for example, a constituent and a member 
 
14 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1295 (2008). 
15 Wells Harrell, Note, The Speech or Debate Clause Should Not Confer Evidentiary or Non-
Disclosure Privileges, 98 VA. L. REV. 385, 417–21 (2012). 
16 Rayburn House Office Bldg., 552 U.S. 1295. 
17 Harrell, supra note 15, at 385. 
18 United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
19 Id. at 1039. 
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of Congress.20 Such evidence is critical to bringing and winning a case 
against a member of Congress for insider trading.21 
Given the evidentiary obstacles to effective enforcement created by 
Rayburn, the STOCK Act represents a risk-free opportunity for political 
gain by the Legislative Branch that leaves the Executive to do Congress’s 
bidding and pursue fruitless prosecutions. Congress’s arbitrage opportunity 
thus comes at the expense of the Executive and threatens the balance and 
separation of powers. This Note argues that if legislative privilege is 
understood as an institutional privilege of Congress rather than an 
individual privilege of each member of Congress, the courts may recognize 
an institutional, congressional waiver of legislative privilege for any and all 
members charged under the STOCK Act. Such a waiver would restore the 
ability of the Executive to effectively prosecute under the STOCK Act and 
would alleviate separation of powers concerns. 
Part I of this Note identifies the underlying purpose of the Speech or 
Debate Clause and then distinguishes between the two theoretical 
interpretations of legislative privilege as either an individual guarantee or 
an institutional guarantee. A court’s understanding of legislative privilege 
as either an individual privilege of each member of Congress or an 
institutional privilege of Congress as a body will inform whether Congress 
can constitutionally waive the privilege’s application to its members in a 
given act. 
Part II of this Note examines the doctrine of legislative privilege 
within the context of bribery. This doctrine reveals that the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Rayburn represents a move toward a hyperindividualistic 
understanding of legislative privilege that puts the privilege at odds with 
the Clause’s purpose to maintain a separation of powers. Part III details the 
passage of the STOCK Act and the arbitrage opportunity created by 
legislative privilege doctrine. This arbitrage opportunity allowed Congress 
to enact a risk-free policing measure for its ranks that could potentially use 
the Executive Branch as a pawn in the game. Finally, Part IV argues that 
courts should approach legislative privilege as an institutional privilege of 
Congress. This approach will then allow courts to recognize a waiver of 
privilege in the STOCK Act in order to prevent what is otherwise 
congressional arbitrage at the Executive’s expense. 
 
20 See Paul D. Brachman, Note, Outlawing Honest Graft, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 261, 
293–97 (2013); James Hamilton et al., Taking Stock of the STOCK Act, AM. CRIM. L. REV. BLOG (Oct. 
19, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/Drupal/blogs/blog-entry/taking-stock
-stock-act-10-19-2012. 
21 Hamilton et al., supra note 20. 
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I. LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE IN THEORY: TO WHOM DOES THE 
PRIVILEGE BELONG? 
Article I, Section Six of the U.S. Constitution states: 
The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, 
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their 
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and 
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they 
shall not be questioned in any other Place.22 
This Section confers both immunity upon members of Congress from arrest 
arising from legislative acts and a legal privilege protecting information of 
such acts from being used against members.23 This Note addresses only the 
latter guarantee, known as legislative privilege, which is a product of the 
concluding phrase of Section Six—the Speech or Debate Clause. The 
Clause descends from a British provision,24 which by the seventeenth 
century was primarily understood as a dictate underlying the separation of 
powers between Parliament and the British Crown.25 
With the separation of powers as one of the Clause’s primary 
philosophical underpinnings,26 a split in the literature emerged over to 
whom the privilege belongs: the legislature as an institution or the 
individual legislator. This Part provides an overview of these two 
theoretical approaches, including each approach’s understanding of the 
purpose of the Clause, evidence to support that understanding, and finally, 
the waiver implications that follow the two interpretations. Whether the 
privilege belongs to Congress as an institution or to individual members of 
 
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
23 See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 614–15 (1972). 
24 “That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.” United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 
169, 178 (1966) (quoting 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 1, 2 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)). 
25 See Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of 
Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1123 (1973). Though the concept of parliamentary privilege originated 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it was only in 1542 that the privilege was incorporated into the 
Speaker’s Petition (a recorded document that set out the relationship between Parliament and the 
Crown) and understood to represent the separation of powers between Parliament and the Crown. Id. In 
1689, following the Glorious Revolution and the exile of James II, a free speech guarantee for members 
of Parliament was included in the newly drafted English Bill of Rights. Id. at 1133. Multiple United 
States Supreme Court Justices have also detailed the inheritance of the Clause from the British. See 
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 545–46 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Johnson, 383 U.S. at 
177–79. 
26 See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 178–79; Craig M. Bradley, The Speech or Debate Clause: Bastion of 
Congressional Independence or Haven for Corruption?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 197, 223 (1979); Reinstein & 
Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1145. But see JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW 91 (2007) 
(proposing that the privilege is best interpreted as facilitating popular sovereignty rather than separation 
of powers). 
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Congress carries implications for the constitutionality of an institutional, 
statutory waiver of such legislative privilege by Congress. 
A. Legislative Privilege as an Individual Guarantee 
The characterization of legislative privilege as an individual guarantee 
is animated by a textual reading of Article I, early state case law, a concern 
for the separation of powers, and the rights of the people. First, the 
theoretical case for legislative privilege as an individual guarantee finds 
support in the text of the Constitution.27 In his 1833 Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, Justice Joseph Story articulated a 
distinction between rights belonging to the body (possibly such as those 
contained in Article I, Section Five, which refers to “each House” when 
conferring powers to the institution of Congress28) and Article I, Section 
Six, which addresses “Senators and Representatives.”29 On the basis of this 
textual distinction, Story concludes that Section Six’s legislative privilege 
is an individual right.30 By considering the text of Article I’s various 
Sections in relation to one another, Section Five’s repeated reference to the 
institutions of the House and Senate builds a case for Section Six’s 
privilege to be understood as an individual one, given Section Six’s 
multiple references to legislators’ specific titles.31 
In addition to the text of the Constitution, individual right theorists32 
rely on the frequently cited Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
opinion in Coffin v. Coffin.33 As one of the first U.S. cases on record 
dealing with legislative privilege,34 Coffin provides insight into the judicial 
understanding of legislative privilege in the early Republic. The 1808 case 
dealt with the application of Massachusetts’s state legislative privilege 
provision35 in a defamation suit brought against a member of the state 
 
27 See James J. Brudney, Congressional Accountability and Denial: Speech or Debate Clause and 
Conflict of Interest Challenges to Unionization of Congressional Employees, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 
28–29 (1999). 
28 See id. for the suggestion that Justice Story “stressed this distinction” between Section Five and 
Section Six. Article I, Section 5 powers include the power of each House to be “the Judge of [its] 
Elections, Returns and Qualifications,” “determine the Rules of its Proceedings,” and “punish its 
Members for disorderly Behaviour.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 847, at 317 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (cited in Brudney, supra note 27, at 
28–29 & n.132). 
30 STORY, supra note 29, § 847, at 317. 
31 See Brudney, supra note 27, at 28–29. 
32 See id. at 29; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1166. 
33 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808). 
34 See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1172 n.289. 
35 “The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential 
to the rights of the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or 
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House of Representatives.36 The court held that the privilege did not belong 
to the legislature as a body, but rather to each individual member, “even 
against the declared will of the house.”37 The court reasoned that an 
individual member of the legislature “does not hold this privilege at the 
pleasure of the house, but derives it from the will of the people . . . which is 
paramount to the will of either or both branches of the legislature.”38 
Therefore, the court defined the privilege as an individual privilege in the 
name of executing the will of the sovereign people rather than immunizing 
legislators from prosecution for their own benefit.39 
The Massachusetts court placed the will of the people above, and in 
this case, against, the desire of the legislative body to waive the privilege. 
Justice Story’s editors later cited Coffin for this same proposition made by 
Story: “these rights and privileges are in truth the rights and privileges of 
[the member’s] constituents, and for their benefit and security, rather than 
the rights and privileges of the member for his own benefit and security.”40 
Justice Story reiterated the Massachusetts court’s reliance on the concept of 
a sovereign people, and not simply the separation of powers, to justify 
insulation of individual members of the Legislative Branch.41 
The individual right theory has found similar support from the 
academy. Professors Robert Reinstein and Harvey Silverglate, in their 
seminal 1973 article on the history and development of legislative 
privilege, concluded that legislative privilege is “guaranteed to each 
member personally, and its constitutional protection is not subject to 
collective discretion.”42 In other words, Congress as a whole cannot waive a 
privilege that does not belong to it as an institution. 
Professors Reinstein and Silverglate contend that in “executive-
motivated suits,” the Speech or Debate Clause should be interpreted 
 
complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.” MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXI (1780), reprinted 
in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 11, 13. 
36 Coffin, 4 Mass. at 1–4. 
37 Id. at 27. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 850 & n.b, 
at 622 (photo. reprint 1994) (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 5th ed. 1891); see 
Melville M. Bigelow, Preface to the Fifth Edition of STORY, supra, at v (stating that “[t]he editorial 
notes have been separated entirely from the notes of the author; the latter run across the page, after 
numerals, the former are in double columns, after letters of the alphabet”). 
41 See Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the Problem of Congressional 
Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 435 (1994) (“Even those who consider the privilege to belong 
to the member are emphatic that its purpose is to benefit the people rather than their representative.”). 
42 Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1169–70. 
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broadly to serve the greater interest of separation of powers.43 They find 
that “even well-meaning executive challenges” can have a chilling effect 
on legislators.44 In their view, the Executive poses the primary threat to 
legislative independence despite the Executive Branch’s often-sincere 
underlying motives.45 Therefore, the purpose of the Speech or Debate 
Clause is to preserve legislative independence by preventing Executive 
encroachment.46 In order to give effect to this purpose, Professors Reinstein 
and Silverglate argue that legislative privilege must be observed as an 
individual guarantee.47 
B. Legislative Privilege as an Institutional Guarantee 
Consensus has largely coalesced around the purpose of the Speech or 
Debate Clause to “protect[] the integrity of the legislative process” through 
an effective separation of powers.48 To that end, Professor Craig Bradley, 
whose 1979 work on the Clause is still the primary counterpoint to 
Professors Reinstein and Silverglate’s work, similarly asserts that the 
Clause’s basic purpose is to protect the powers of the Legislative Branch 
from encroachment by the other branches.49 Among those who conceive of 
legislative privilege as an institutional guarantee, this purpose is best served 
by viewing members of Congress as part of the larger legislative scheme.50 
Given the limited discussion of the Speech or Debate Clause at the 
Constitutional Convention,51 Founding Era records from outside the 
 
43 Id. at 1145–46. Reinstein and Silverglate, however, draw a clear distinction between the scope of 
the privilege as applied to Executive-brought suits and as applied to private civil suits claiming 
violations of constitutional rights. See id. at 1177 (“It would be a supreme irony if the speech or debate 
privilege . . . were construed so that courts lend their assistance to the executive in breaching the wall of 
separation of powers but deny relief for the violation of individual rights.”). 
44 Id. at 1145–46. 
45 Id. at 1145. 
46 Id. at 1145–46. 
47 Id. at 1169–70. 
48 Ray, supra note 41, at 435. 
49 Bradley, supra note 26, at 223. 
50 See, e.g., Ray, supra note 41, at 435. 
51 In a 1966 case dealing with legislative privilege, Justice Harlan wrote, “The Speech or Debate 
Clause of the Constitution was approved at the Constitutional Convention without discussion and 
without opposition.” United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966); see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 166 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). In fact, the Articles of 
Confederation already contained a virtually identical clause: “Freedom of speech and debate in 
Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court, or place out of Congress, and the members 
of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonments, during the time of their 
going to and from, and attendance on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.” 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V, para. 5. Its constitutional successor was neither 
questioned nor opposed at the states’ ratification debates or within the press, and three state 
constitutions already included speech or debate clauses when the U.S. Constitution was drafted. See 
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373–75 (1951) (quoting the privilege provisions within the 1776 
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Convention provide much of the support for Professor Bradley and his 
fellow proponents of the privilege as an institutional guarantee. Numerous 
sources indicate that the Framers were conscious of British parliamentary 
abuse of the privilege when adopting it in the United States.52 Most notably, 
in an 1832 letter responding to a Virginia congressman, James Madison 
wrote: “It is certain that the privilege has been abused in British 
precedents.”53 He continued that when “difficulties and differences of 
opinion” arise in privilege cases, “the reason and necessity of the privilege 
must be the guide.”54 Thus, Madison conceived of a Clause driven by 
function rather than form given the latter’s susceptibility to workarounds 
and abuse.55 
Thomas Jefferson had articulated his own vision of the privilege in his 
1801 work, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice.56 Jefferson wrote that 
“[t]he privilege of a member is the privilege of the House,” and “[p]rivilege 
is in the power of the House, and is a restraint to the proceeding of inferior 
courts.”57 Jefferson thus asserted the right of Congress as an institution to 
make decisions as to privilege seven years before the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts held nearly the opposite in Coffin v. Coffin.58 
Relying in large part on Jefferson’s understanding of the privilege, 
Professor Bradley concludes that the Clause “was not intended to protect 
the minority in Congress” from criminalization by the majority in 
Congress, but rather to protect the whole Legislative Branch from an 
encroaching Executive or Judiciary.59 
 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, and the New Hampshire 
Constitution of 1784); CHAFETZ, supra note 26, at 87–88. 
52 See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972) (“The history of the privilege is by no 
means free from grave abuses by legislators.”); id. at 545 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“That the 
Parliamentary privilege was indeed abused is historical fact.”). But see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra 
note 25, at 1139 (“[T]hat the abuses of other privileges can be imputed to the speech or debate 
privilege, an argument expressed by Chief Justice Burger in Brewster, depends upon an historical 
construction that is more creative than descriptive.”). 
53 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 221 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 
1867); see also Brewster, 408 U.S. at 546 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Madison in THE 
FEDERALIST No. 48 when noting “that the Framers, aware of these abuses, were determined to guard 
against them”). 
54 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 53, at 221; see also Reinstein & 
Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1140 n.142. 
55 Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1140. 
56 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE § III, at 19 (1801) (cited in 
Bradley, supra note 26, at 224). 
57 Id. at 25–26; see Ray, supra note 41, at 434. 
58 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808) (holding that the privilege belongs to the individual member and 
not the legislative house). 
59 Bradley, supra note 26, at 223–24. 
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C. Institutional Waiver of Legislative Privilege 
The character of legislative privilege, be it individual or institutional, 
ultimately determines the constitutionality of an institutional waiver of the 
privilege. Such an institutional waiver would apply to a specific statute and 
would not eliminate legislative privilege across the board; rather, an 
institutional waiver would prohibit members of Congress from invoking 
legislative privilege when charged with a crime or facing a liability created 
under a specific piece of legislation. For scholars who interpret legislative 
privilege as a guarantee belonging to individual members of Congress, it 
follows that Congress as a body could not waive legislative privilege 
through statutory action. As a result, courts cannot read congressional 
intent for an implied institutional waiver into a given statute. The primary 
objection is that a constitutionally guaranteed privilege of an individual 
member should not be waived at the discretion of a majority or even a 
supermajority.60 Professor James Brudney argues, to allow institutional 
waiver would allow “a legislative majority to suppress dissent simply by 
criminalizing conduct otherwise thought of as legislative.”61 In light of this 
tyranny-of-the-majority argument, opponents of institutional waiver reject 
the concept based on its implication that Congress, as opposed to the 
courts, would “determine the scope of the constitutional privilege.”62 In 
other words, a congressional decision to waive legislative privilege’s 
individual guarantee may imply that Congress can interpret and limit a 
constitutional provision rather than the Judicial Branch. 
While a member of Congress may always choose to waive her own 
privilege under the individual privilege theory, the lack of incentive to do 
so reveals the individual theory as one open to wide abuse by self-
interested actors. Professors Reinstein and Silverglate concede this much, 
but recognize the abuse as a necessary evil in order to preserve the greater 
purpose of effective separation of powers.63 Yet the bribery case law that 
has developed under the individual privilege theory has significantly 
increased the opportunity for such abuse,64 and the STOCK Act merely 
creates another opportunity for corruption to go unpunished in the face of 
hamstrung attempts by the Executive to hold members of Congress 
accountable. An institutional approach offers an alternative to this problem. 
 
60 See Brudney, supra note 27, at 28–30; Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1170. 
61 See Brudney, supra note 27, at 29. But see supra Part I.B (discussing Professor Bradley’s 
contention that the Clause’s purpose is not the protection of a minority in Congress from the majority, 
but rather protection of the Legislative Branch as a whole). 
62 Brudney, supra note 27, at 29; see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1170. 
63 Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 25, at 1170 (“[I]t must be admitted that in some cases 
wrongdoing may go unquestioned, uninvestigated, or unpunished . . . .”). 
64 See infra Part II. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
618 
An institutional understanding of legislative privilege implies that an 
institutional waiver of privilege is constitutional. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly and deliberately avoided the question of whether Congress may 
waive Speech or Debate Clause protection.65 If, however, the privilege is to 
serve as an institutional guard against both Executive Branch encroachment 
and Legislative Branch corruption, institutional waiver may be appropriate 
and constitutional in certain circumstances.66 If the intent of the Framers 
was to protect the legislature as a whole from encroachment by the 
Executive, as Jefferson and Madison similarly imply, a statute passed by 
the legislature as a whole may indeed serve as a waiver.67 
Furthermore, existing safeguards may limit the potential threat that a 
waiver poses to legislative independence. Institutional waiver, as 
envisioned by Professors Bradley and Laura Krugman Ray, applies to a 
particular statute.68 It therefore can strengthen anticorruption statutes but 
would be limited to specific pieces of legislation and not eliminate 
legislative privilege wholesale. An institutional waiver is further limited by 
Congress’s institutional ability to repeal or amend statutes.69 If an 
institutional waiver is later determined to allow the Executive to encroach 
upon the independence of the Legislative Branch, Congress can simply 
repeal that waiver.70 Therefore, the legislative process itself provides an 
additional safeguard on the institutional waiver. In fact, one supporter of 
the institutional waiver, Professor Ray, argues that in practice, bribery and 
other corrupt practices have posed a more serious threat to legislative 
independence than harassment by the Executive Branch.71 Ultimately, the 
constitutionality of an institutional waiver will determine the ability of the 
Executive to access the evidence necessary to build a case against a 
member of Congress or her staff. In turn, the enforceability of the STOCK 
Act depends on whether an institutional waiver is constitutional. 
 
65 United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 490–93 (1979). In Helstoski, the Court, assuming 
arguendo that Congress as a body could waive the protection, found no evidence of such a waiver in the 
statutory text or legislative history of the bribery statute. Id. at 492–93. See infra Part II.A. 
66 See Bradley, supra note 26, at 223–25; Ray, supra note 41, at 435–36; see also David M. 
Lederkramer, Note, A Statutory Proposal for Case-by-Case Congressional Waiver of the Speech or 
Debate Privilege in Bribery Cases, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 465, 467, 504–10 (1982) (construing a 
functional analysis of the Speech or Debate Clause that renders waiver constitutional and proposing that 
Congress as a body pass special legislation waiving legislative privilege after the initiation of a specific 
case against a member of Congress). 
67 Bradley, supra note 26, at 223–25. 
68 See id. at 223; Ray, supra note 41, at 436. 
69 See Ray, supra note 41, at 436. 
70 See id. 
71 Id. at 432. 
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II. LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE 
The D.C. Circuit’s 2007 decision in United States v. Rayburn House 
Office Building72 revealed a new discord between the understanding of 
legislative privilege as an individual guarantee and the Speech or Debate 
Clause’s function within the separation of powers. Rayburn succeeds a line 
of twentieth-century Supreme Court bribery cases that defined the contours 
of legislative privilege in the face of the federal bribery statute. 
The twentieth-century bribery cases struggled to balance the privilege 
with corruption charges based on a federal statute, but Rayburn wholly 
embraced legislative privilege in the bribery context. Rayburn expanded 
the idea of privilege to permit withholding materials pertaining to 
legislative acts from the Executive Branch in a criminal investigation.73 The 
doctrine illustrates the progression of the Clause from a privilege that 
coexisted with anticorruption statutes to Rayburn’s full-throttled 
construction of legislative privilege as an absolute and powerful individual 
guarantee. The first step in understanding this doctrine is an examination of 
the bribery statute case law. Then, a look at Rayburn, what it means for the 
D.C. Circuit, and how Congress views it allows for an understanding of the 
environment into which the STOCK Act was born. 
A. Bribery 
Some of the Supreme Court’s most significant legislative privilege 
jurisprudence developed in reference to the federal bribery statute. Though 
one of the first post-Ratification laws that Congress adopted dealt with 
bribery of public officials, Congress did not subject its own members to the 
sanctions of a bribery statute until 1853.74 The Act of February 26, 185375 
 
72 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
73 Id. at 662–63. 
74 PETER J. HENNING & LEE J. RADEK, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION 
3–4 (2011). 
75 The text of the Act states: 
And be it further enacted, That if any person or persons shall, directly or indirectly, promise, 
offer, or give, or cause or procure to be promised, offered, or given, any money, goods, right in 
action, bribe, present, or reward, or any promise, contract, undertaking, obligation, or security 
for the payment or delivery of any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or 
any other valuable thing whatever, to any member of the Senate or House of Representatives of 
the United States, . . . with intent to influence his vote or decision on any question, matter, 
cause, or proceeding which may then be pending, or may by law, or under the Constitution of 
the United States, be brought before him in his official capacity, or in his place of trust or 
profit, . . . such person . . . and the member, officer, or person who shall in anywise accept or 
receive the same, or any part thereof, shall be liable to indictment as for a high crime and 
misdemeanor in any court of the United States having jurisdiction for the trial of crimes and 
misdemeanors; and shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding three times the 
amount so offered, promised, or given, and imprisoned in a penitentiary not exceeding three 
years; and the person convicted of so accepting or receiving the same, or any part thereof, if an 
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criminalized both the offer of a bribe to any federal officer and the 
acceptance of a bribe by a federal officer.76 Furthermore, the statute 
explicitly conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts over charges against 
members of Congress.77 The congressional record is silent on the 
applicability of the Speech or Debate Clause to the Act,78 and multiple 
scholars have reasonably understood this silence to mean that legislative 
privilege was not considered at the Act’s passage.79 A century later, 
Congress consolidated the various bribery statutes under 18 U.S.C. § 201.80 
The Senate report accompanying the bill made clear that the reorganization 
and consolidation of the statutes “would not restrict the broad scope of the 
present bribery statutes as construed by the courts.”81 Therefore, 
assumptions about privilege under the 1853 statute carried through to 
§ 201. 
One of the first modern cases to consider whether legislative privilege 
may obviate a criminal statute did not involve bribery. The 1966 Supreme 
Court case of United States v. Johnson involved conspiracy and conflict of 
interest statutes rather than the bribery statute.82 Yet, Justice Harlan, writing 
for the Court in Johnson, laid the foundation for evaluation of the bribery 
statute and future statutory delegations of prosecutorial authority over 
members of Congress.83 The Court held that because the Government’s 
conspiracy prosecution of a congressman was based on his House floor 
speech—an inherently “legislative act[]”—and the motives behind the 
speech, it violated the Speech or Debate Clause.84 The Court, however, was 
 
officer or person holding any such place of trust or profit as aforesaid, shall forfeit his office or 
place; and any person so convicted under this section shall forever be disqualified to hold any 
office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States. 
Ch. 81, § 6, 10 Stat. 170, 171. 
76 Id.; Ray, supra note 41, at 418. 
77 See Ray, supra note 41, at 418 & n.149. 
78 CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 288–97 (1853). 
79 See Bradley, supra note 26, at 225 n.166; Ray, supra note 41, at 418–19 & nn.149–51; Note, The 
Bribed Congressman’s Immunity from Prosecution, 75 YALE L.J. 335, 341 n.40 (1965). Similarly, 
Chief Justice Burger cited to the lack of discussion of the Speech or Debate Clause during debates of 
the Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 180, 12 Stat. 577, which prohibited a member of Congress from accepting 
anything of value in exchange for procurement of government contract. The Act was later incorporated 
into 18 U.S.C. § 201, and Chief Justice Burger used the lack of legislative history to conclude that there 
is no evidence of an institutional waiver of legislative privilege in § 201. United States v. Helstoski, 442 
U.S. 477, 493 & n.8 (1979). 
80 HENNING & RADEK, supra note 74, at 16; see Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119 (1962) (codified 
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1964)). 
81 S. REP. NO. 87-2213, at 4 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852; HENNING & RADEK, 
supra note 74, at 16. 
82 383 U.S. 169, 170–71 (1966). 
83 See id. at 185. 
84 Id. at 184–85. 
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careful not to foreclose all criminal prosecutions based on legislative acts.85 
Instead, the Court left “open for consideration” the prohibitive nature of 
legislative privilege when it pertained to a statute that was “narrowly 
drawn . . . in the exercise of [Congress’s] legislative power to regulate the 
conduct of its members.”86 It remained to be seen whether § 201 was 
sufficiently narrow. 
In 1972, the Supreme Court reviewed the United States’ case against 
Senator Daniel Brewster, who had accepted a bribe in exchange for his vote 
on postage-rate legislation.87 In United States v. Brewster, the Court 
concluded that the illegal act in the case of bribery was the acceptance of 
the bribe and not the legislative act performed in fulfillment of the bribe, 
i.e., Senator Brewster’s vote.88 Therefore, the Court found that an 
examination of whether § 201 was sufficiently narrow was not of great 
import, and the Speech or Debate Clause did not prohibit a bribery 
prosecution.89 
In the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger distinguished the 
Speech or Debate Clause from its British predecessor, noting, “Our speech 
or debate privilege was designed to preserve legislative independence, not 
supremacy.”90 With the separation of powers as its principled basis, the 
Court attempted to balance the “remote” possibility of abuse of Executive 
investigatory and prosecutorial power with the danger of living in a world 
with no statute prohibiting members of Congress from accepting bribes.91 
The Court, finding appropriate the delegations of power to the Executive to 
investigate and prosecute members of Congress, referenced Congress’s 
limited ability to self-police matters such as bribery given members’ 
“disinclination” to do so.92 Though Congress is constitutionally designed to 
discipline its own members under its Article I, Section 5 authority, 
Professor Ray has found that “neither branch of Congress has . . . compiled 
an exemplary record of self-discipline.”93 
In recognizing that § 201 was an appropriate delegation of power and 
therefore constitutionally subjected members of Congress to possible 
prosecution, the Court maintained that no such prosecution could be made 
 
85 Id. at 185. 
86 Id. 
87 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 502–03 (1972). 
88 Id. at 526. 
89 Id. at 510, 528–29. 
90 Id. at 508. 
91 Id. at 524. 
92 Id. at 525. 
93 Ray, supra note 41, at 408. For a discussion about the limits of congressional self-policing 
through internal discipline, see id. at 408–18. 
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on the basis of an inquiry into legislative acts.94 Thus a distinct space was 
made for application of the Speech or Debate Clause’s legislative privilege: 
it was not so broad as to protect corrupt members of Congress who would 
in turn corrupt the legislative process, but it was not so narrow as to 
threaten the independence of the Legislative Branch.95 
Seven years later, in United States v. Helstoski, the Court concluded 
that mere passage of the bribery statute did not constitute a blanket waiver 
of members’ Speech or Debate Clause protection.96 The Government 
charged Henry Helstoski, a former congressman, with conspiracy to violate 
the bribery statute when he accepted bribes from alien residents in 
exchange for introducing private bills that would allow them to avoid 
deportation.97 The Court held that the Speech or Debate Clause prevented 
the Government from admitting evidence of past legislative acts, such as 
introduction of the bills, to establish its case against Helstoski.98 
Taking a cue from Johnson and Brewster, the Court declined to decide 
whether a member of Congress could be prosecuted for a distinctly 
legislative act under a narrowly tailored policing statute.99 Rather, it made 
clear that mere enactment of § 201 “does not amount to a congressional 
waiver of the protection of the Clause for individual Members.”100 The 
Court acknowledged potential problems with an institutional waiver of 
legislative privilege through statutory enactment.101 The Court cited both 
logic and case law to illustrate the plausible argument against such a 
waiver. Logically speaking, the Court recognized the argument that 
Congress, as a body, might not be able to deprive individual members of 
their constitutionally guaranteed privilege.102 For case law, the Court cited 
Coffin v. Coffin and United States v. Brewster, which both found that the 
privilege operated as an individual guarantee, not an institutional one.103 
Nevertheless, Justice Burger took the time to rule out the possibility 
that an institutional waiver existed within the bribery statute. Writing for 
the Court, he noted, “Assuming, arguendo, that the Congress could 
 
94 Brewster, 408 U.S. at 510. 
95 See id. at 525. “Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be read broadly to effectuate its 
purpose of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch, but no more than the statutes we 
apply, was its purpose to make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal 
responsibility.” Id. at 516. 
96 442 U.S. 477, 492 (1979). 
97 Id. at 479. 
98 Id. at 489. 
99 Id. at 492. 
100 Id. 
101 See id. at 490–93. 
102 Id. at 492–93. 
103 Id. at 493. 
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constitutionally waive the protection of the Clause for individual Members, 
such waiver could be shown only by an explicit and unequivocal 
expression.”104 The Court looked to the language and legislative history of 
both § 201 and its predecessor acts105 to rule out the possibility of such an 
expression.106 Ultimately, the Court declined to conclude whether such a 
waiver could constitutionally exist.107 In doing so, the Court allowed for the 
possibility of an institutional waiver in a future statute,108 though it did not 
find one in this case.109 
After Brewster and Helstoski, § 201 appropriately applies to members 
of Congress but not to the extent that it vitiates their protection under the 
Speech or Debate Clause. Hints of both understandings of legislative 
privilege—institutional and individual—exist in the case law, and the D.C. 
Circuit’s subsequent decision in Rayburn only serves to further complicate 
the Speech or Debate Clause doctrine. 
B. United States v. Rayburn House Office Building and the 
Nondisclosure Privilege 
On a Saturday night in May 2006, more than a dozen FBI agents 
searched through paper and electronic documents in the Capitol Hill office 
of U.S. Representative William Jefferson.110 The agents entered the 
Rayburn office on suspicion that Representative Jefferson and others had 
sought and accepted consideration in certain business ventures in exchange 
for the execution of official acts.111 Four days after the search, then-Speaker 
of the House J. Dennis Hastert and Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi issued a 
“rare”112 joint statement condemning the search: 
The Justice Department was wrong to seize records from Congressman 
Jefferson’s office in violation of the Constitutional principle of Separation of 
 
104 Id. 
105 See supra text accompanying notes 75–76. 
106 Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 493 & n.8. 
107 Id. at 493. 
108 Though not dealing with the bribery statute, in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the 
Court presumed that Congress would not “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history” as 
legislative privilege “by covert inclusion” in the general language of a statute. Id. at 376. The Court 
appears to have approached the suggestion of an implied waiver as one that need overcome the 
rebuttable presumption against it. However, the Court in Tenney nowhere stated that a waiver, implicit 
or explicit, was unconstitutional. Thus, Justice Burger’s inquiry into such a waiver in Helstoski was not 
an abnormal one. 
109 Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 492. 
110 Philip Shenon, F.B.I. Contends Lawmaker Hid Bribe in Freezer, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at 
A1; see also Carl Hulse, House Leaders Demand Return of Seized Files, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006, at 
A1. 
111 United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
112 Hulse, supra note 110. 
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Powers, the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, and the practice of 
the last 219 years. These constitutional principles were not designed by the 
Founding Fathers to place anyone above the law. Rather, they were designed 
to protect the Congress and the American people from abuses of power, and 
those principles deserve to be vigorously defended.113 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed. The court held that 
compelled disclosure of documents relating to legislative acts would 
constitute a distraction from the legislative process and a violation of the 
Speech or Debate Clause.114 Ultimately, the court interpreted legislative 
privilege broadly to permit nondisclosure of covered materials to the 
Executive Branch or any of its agents, even in a criminal investigation.115 
The Government sought a writ of certiorari in Rayburn, but the 
Supreme Court denied the petition.116 The denial came in spite of the 
petition’s obvious yet worthwhile warning that the D.C. Circuit’s decision, 
if left undisturbed, will play a unique and primary role in Congress’s 
understanding of the reach of Speech or Debate Clause protections given 
the geographic location of the Capitol.117 As the Government understood 
the law, the extension of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rayburn could 
potentially “impede searches of Members’ homes, vehicles, or briefcases” 
and not merely prohibit the “concededly extraordinary event” of searching 
a member’s Capitol Hill office.118 Consequently, Rayburn expanded the 
individual guarantee that the Supreme Court had established in its bribery 
cases, and significantly shifted the balance in a corruption prosecution in 
favor of the legislator–defendant. 
In Rayburn, the D.C. Circuit did not directly address the criminal 
statutes in play because the issue was not whether the statute applied but 
what evidence may be collected. The reaction of those affected by the 
decision, however, lends institutional insight into how Congress 
understood the relevant statutes to operate. The joint statement by Pelosi 
and Hastert made clear that the leaders of both parties in the House 
opposed the steps taken by the Executive as an encroachment on the 
 
113 Press Release, Joint Statement from Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader Pelosi (May 24, 
2006), available at Lynn Sweet, Hastert, Pelosi Issue Rare Joint Statement: They Blast FBI Raid on 
House Member, CHI. SUN-TIMES BLOG (May 24, 2006, 2:10 PM), http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/
2006/05/hastert_pelosi_issue_rare_join.html. 
114 Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d at 656, 660. 
115 Id. at 662–63. 
116  Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1295 (2008). 
117 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11, Rayburn House Office Bldg., 552 U.S. 1295 (No. 07-816), 
2007 WL 4458912, at *11 (“Investigations designed to ferret out congressional corruption (such as 
bribery) find their nerve center in the Nation’s capital. Because of that fact, decisions of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have a uniquely important role in defining 
the Constitution’s express protection for legislators: the Speech or Debate Clause.”). 
118 Id. at 12, 2007 WL 4458912 at *12. 
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independence of the Legislative Branch.119 But their statement should not 
be read as congressional absolution of Jefferson’s sins. Rather, Pelosi 
encouraged Jefferson to give up his seat on the powerful House Ways and 
Means Committee, and both Pelosi and Hastert urged Jefferson to 
cooperate with the Justice Department’s investigation once the privileged 
documents were returned.120 
In addition to the party leaders’ statements, a group of former high-
ranking congressional staffers filed an amici curiae brief in opposition to 
the Government’s petition for certiorari.121 The brief makes clear that its 
aim is not the protection of Jefferson but rather the preservation of the 
independence of the Legislative Branch.122 The press release and the amici 
brief illustrate that the Executive Branch exceeded what Congress as an 
institution, represented by its leadership, understood to be limits on its 
delegation of the prosecutorial and investigatory function. 
Four years later, the Supreme Court similarly denied a petition for a 
writ of certiorari, this time on behalf of former U.S. Representative Richard 
Renzi of Arizona.123 In United States v. Renzi, the Ninth Circuit expressly 
disagreed with the holding of the D.C. Circuit in Rayburn and its broad 
nondisclosure privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause.124 The Supreme 
Court chose not to take the case, and the split between the circuits125 was 
not resolved.126 Consequently, Rayburn remains settled law in the District 
of Columbia. 
 
119 Hulse, supra note 110. 
120 Id. 
121 Brief for Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 1–4, Rayburn House Office Bldg., 552 U.S. 
1295 (No. 07-816), 2008 WL 534800, at *1–4. The brief’s authors include the former Chief of Staff and 
the former Director of Floor Operations to then-House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, the former Chief of 
Staff to House Minority Whip Steny H. Hoyer, the former counsel to Representative F. James 
Sensenbrenner, and the former Counsel to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Id. at 2–4, 
2008 WL 534800 at *2–4. 
122 Id. at 4, 2008 WL 534800 at *4. 
123 United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
124 Id. at 1037–39. 
125 It is critical to note that the Government, in its brief in opposition to Renzi’s petition, went out 
of its way to clarify that the question at issue in Renzi was not one of whether a legislative privilege to 
nondisclosure exists. The Government attempted to argue that the dispositive question was whether a 
nondisclosure privilege would entitle a legislator to a hearing to determine if the privileged evidence 
was used to procure nonprivileged evidence. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 13–22, Renzi, 
132 S. Ct. 1097 (No. 11-557), 2011 WL 6370518, at *13–22. 
126 Denial of certiorari in Renzi without additional guidance from the Supreme Court should not be 
interpreted as Supreme Court approval of the decision in Rayburn. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 
226 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The significance of a denial of a petition for certiorari ought 
no longer to require discussion. This Court has said again and again and again that such a denial has no 
legal significance whatever bearing on the merits of the claim. The denial means that this Court has 
refused to take the case. It means nothing else.”). For a discussion of the merits of the decisions, see, for 
example, Emily E. Eineman, Note, Congressional Criminality and Balance of Powers: Are Internal 
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III. THE STOP TRADING ON CONGRESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE  
(STOCK) ACT 
Rayburn’s hyperindividual guarantee created an arbitrage opportunity 
for Congress: it enabled Congress to pass politically popular laws that 
delegate enforcement to another branch, even though enforcement of the 
laws practically could never be carried out. After the Supreme Court 
declined to consider the most viable attempt to disturb Rayburn’s hold on 
the D.C. Circuit by denying certiorari in Renzi, legislative privilege theory 
and doctrine essentially collided. When the dust cleared, Congress passed 
the STOCK Act. 
In light of legislative privilege’s theory and doctrine, the STOCK Act 
presented an opportunity for Congress to receive an essentially risk-free 
political gain by delegating a criminal enforcement power to the Executive. 
The Executive is expected to expend manpower and resources to carry out 
its duty to enforce the law only to meet the legislative privilege roadblock 
when the time comes to gather the evidence necessary to successfully 
prosecute or pursue civil charges under the Act. In other words, Congress 
could potentially game the system at the expense of the Executive Branch 
in large part because of Rayburn’s nondisclosure privilege. This Part first 
looks to the STOCK Act’s legislative history to determine its purported 
goals and the extent to which Congress understood the limitations placed 
on the Act by legislative privilege at the Act’s passage. Then, this Part 
examines the arbitrage opportunity created by the confluence of theory, 
doctrine, and the STOCK Act. 
A. STOCK Act Legislative History 
In 2006, amidst news reports of the dubious stock dealings of Tony 
Rudy, chief of staff to former Representative Tom Delay,127 
 
Filter Teams Really What Our Forefathers Envisioned?, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595 (2007); A.J. 
Green, Note, United States v. Renzi: Reigning in the Speech or Debate Clause to Fight Corruption in 
Congress Post-Rayburn, 2012 BYU L. REV. 493; Harrell, supra note 15; John P. Moore, Comment, In 
Search of Congress: Why an Executive Branch Search of a Congressional Office Violates the Speech or 
Debate Clause and How Congress Should Respond, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 253 (2007); John D. Pingel, 
Note, Do Congressmen Still Pay Parking Tickets? The D.C. Circuit’s Overextension of Legislative 
Privilege in United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1621 (2009); John 
C. Raffetto, Note, Balancing the Legislative Shield: The Scope of the Speech or Debate Clause, 
59 CATH. U. L. REV. 883 (2010); and Brian Reimels, Note, United States v. Rayburn House Office 
Building, Room 2113: A Midnight Raid on the Constitution or Business as Usual?, 57 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 293 (2008). 
127 The reports detail Rudy’s trading of hundreds of stocks from his government computer between 
1999 and 2000 and question whether his trades were based on disclosed information or material, 
nonpublic information. See Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trading in Congress: The Need for 
Regulation, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 199, 203–04 (2009); Brody Mullins, Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading 
by Lawmakers and Their Aides, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at A1; President Obama Praises 
Slaughter, supra note 1. 
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Representatives Louise Slaughter and Brian Baird of Washington 
introduced the STOCK Act.128 The STOCK Act, as originally introduced, 
prohibited members of Congress and their staff from trading securities 
based on knowledge obtained because of their status.129 While the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates insider trading 
pursuant to its authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
Congress never defined insider trading as an offense in the Exchange 
Act.130 Rather, an internally promulgated SEC rule, Rule 10b-5,131 serves to 
prohibit fraud and calls for violations to either be punished as civil offenses 
by the SEC or prosecuted as crimes by the Department of Justice.132 While 
there are debates as to whether congressional insider trading was already 
strictly prohibited under the SEC rule,133 observers have documented the 
SEC’s blind eye towards congressional insider trading.134 In fact, two years 
before the reports of Rudy’s dealings were published, an academic study 
found that the stock portfolios of U.S. senators bested the market average 
by 97 basis points (or nearly 1%) per month.135 And the Rudy scandal was 
just one of several that created a call for at-large congressional ethics 
reform.136 However, the STOCK Act did not gain real momentum in 
Congress until after the airing of the 60 Minutes report in November 
2011.137 
By the fall of 2011, congressional approval ratings had fallen to 
13%.138 The Occupy Wall Street movement, which had drawn attention to 
the inequities between the middle class and the wealthy few—personified 
by Wall Street bankers—had an approval rating of more than double that of 
 
128 President Obama Praises Slaughter, supra note 1. 
129 Id. 
130 Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Enforcement, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 1105, 1109–10 (2011). 
131 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided the SEC with authority to 
promulgate Rule 10b-5. In turn, 10b-5 prohibits insider trading. 10b-5 sets the parameters on the SEC 
and Department of Justice’s enforcement authority. See id. 
132 Id. 
133 Compare id. at 1111 (“[T]he current law . . . works as well for congressional officials as it does 
for every other person who trades securities in our capital markets.”), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CORP. L. 281, 297 (2011) (“As to members of Congress, . . . 
current law provides a strong argument that their trading cannot be punished under either the classic 
disclose or abstain or the misappropriation theory.”). 
134 Bainbridge, supra note 133, at 303, 307. 
135 Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. 
Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661, 675 (2004); see Nagy, supra note 130, at 1106. 
136 Barbabella et al., supra note 127, at 202–05. 
137 See supra text accompanying notes 5–7. 
138 Jeffrey M. Jones, Congressional Job Approval Essentially Flat at 12%, GALLUP POL. (Mar. 21, 
2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/153377/congressional-job-approval-essentially-flat.aspx. 
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Congress.139 Then, in January 2012, as President Obama was preparing to 
run for reelection, he announced in his State of the Union address: “Send 
me a bill that bans insider trading by Members of Congress, and I will sign 
it tomorrow.”140 By March 2012, right before the 112th Congress passed the 
STOCK Act, approval ratings remained at a dismal 12%.141 Public opinion 
and the political climate were ripe for passage of the STOCK Act. The bill 
passed in the Senate by a margin of 96 to 3, in the House, 417 to 2.142 
1. STOCK Act Provisions.—The heart of the STOCK Act is its 
prohibition on congressional insider trading.143 The prohibition affirms that 
members and congressional employees are not exempt from the Exchange 
Act’s regulation of insider trading.144 Significantly, the prohibition 
recognizes that members and congressional employees have an affirmative 
duty to the institution of Congress, the United States Government, and the 
citizens of the United States with regard “to material, nonpublic 
information derived from such person’s position.”145 The duty is asserted on 
the basis of the “trust and confidence owed by each Member of Congress 
and each employee of Congress.”146 
The “trust and confidence” language was not in the original text of the 
bill.147 It was added as a result of concerns expressed in the bill’s committee 
hearings and markup in order to “remove any uncertainty about the 
prohibition on insider trading.”148 According to Senator Carl Levin of 
Michigan, “[e]stablishing such a duty removes any doubt as to whether 
insider trading prohibitions apply to Congress.”149 If, as Senator Levin has 
stated, the trust and confidence language serves to “reassure[] the American 
people that there are no barriers to prosecuting Members and employees of 
Congress for insider trading,”150 does a duty of trust and confidence owed 
to the American populace vitiate legislative privilege? 
 
139 See Bill Chappell, Occupy Wall Street Gets Union Backing; Approval Rating Tops Congress, 
NPR BLOG (Oct. 5, 2011, 4:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/10/05/141089001/
occupy-wall-street-gets-union-backing-approval-rating-tops-congress. 
140 President Obama Praises Slaughter, supra note 1. 
141 Jones, supra note 138. 
142 Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress (2011–2012): S.2038 Major Congressional Actions, 
THOMAS (LIBR. OF CONGRESS), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN02038:@@@R (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
143 See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, § 4, 126 Stat. 
291, 292. 
144 See supra text accompanying note 131. 
145 STOCK Act, § 4(b), 126 Stat. at 292. 
146 Id. 
147 See H.R. 1148, 112th Cong. (2011) (as introduced to the House on Mar. 17, 2011). 
148 158 CONG. REC. S141 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
149 Id. at S142. 
150 Id. at S141. 
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2. Congressional Knowledge at STOCK Act Passage.—In United 
States v. Helstoski, the Supreme Court, assuming the constitutionality of an 
institutional waiver, found that 18 U.S.C. § 201 (the federal bribery statute) 
did not constitute a waiver of legislative privilege on the basis of its 
legislative history and the text of the statute.151 In the absence of a waiver in 
the statute’s text, Congress’s understanding of the role of legislative 
privilege in a STOCK Act prosecution is critical to determine whether the 
Act was meant to include a waiver. 
As detailed above, Senator Levin attributed the addition of the trust 
and confidence language to concerns expressed in committee hearings and 
bill markup.152 The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, on which Senator Levin sits, held a hearing on the 
STOCK Act on December 1, 2011. Of the nonmember witnesses, all five 
referenced Speech or Debate Clause concerns in their testimony.153 For 
example, attorney Robert L. Walker warned “not to minimize the potential 
practical difficulties of proving an insider case in Congress, [because] proof 
in some such cases could be impeded by Speech or Debate Clause 
concerns.”154 In the same vein, the written testimony of Melanie Sloan, 
Executive Director of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington, stated that the Clause “will have a bearing on the ability of 
prosecutors to bring charges against members of Congress who trade on 
information obtained through their positions as legislators.”155 The 
transcript of the hearing reflects that Ms. Sloan brought up the issue again 
in an exchange with Senator Mark Begich, when she said, “[T]he Speech or 
Debate Clause . . . would not allow prosecution in an awful lot of these 
 
151 442 U.S. 477, 492 (1979); see supra Part II.A. 
152 See supra Part III.A.1. 
153 See, e.g., Insider Trading and Congressional Accountability: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 62 n.16 (2011) [hereinafter Senate Committee 
Hearing] (statement of Donna M. Nagy, C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer 
School of Law) (citing the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1294 
(D.C. Cir. 1995), as a rejection of the argument that the Speech or Debate Clause stood as an absolute 
bar to indicting Congressman Daniel Rostenkowski); id. at 134 (statement of Donald C. Langevoort, 
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (cautioning that 
“constitutional issues such as the Speech and [sic] Debate Clause lurk in the shadows”); id. at 144 
(statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) 
(“Any Member of Congress is constitutionally entitled by the Speech and [sic] Debate Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution to reveal any information—including material nonpublic information—in 
Congressional debate.”). 
154 Id. at 155–56 (statement of Robert L. Walker, Of Counsel, Wiley Rein LLP). 
155 Id. at 51 (statement of Melanie Sloan, Executive Director, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics 
in Washington). 
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cases,” and then recommended utilizing both Houses’ ethics committees to 
punish members insulated by the Clause.156 
Multiple members of the Senate panel also weighed in on the potential 
obstacle posed by the Speech or Debate Clause to effective enforcement. 
Among the senators, Senator Joseph Lieberman—Chairman of the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs—followed up 
with Ms. Sloan and asked for specific recommendations for how to provide 
the Ethics Committees with jurisdiction to handle insider trading matters.157 
Similarly, the House Committee on Financial Services also debated the 
challenges posed to STOCK Act enforcement by the Speech or Debate 
Clause. At several points during the December 6, 2011 House hearing, 
members of Congress and witnesses alike recognized the potential for 
Speech or Debate Clause obstruction.158 Arguably the strongest statement 
came from Representative Barney Frank who stated, “The narrower the 
[Speech or Debate Clause] is used, the better it will be. People should not 
be prosecuted for things they say on the Floor, for libel or for other reasons, 
but the [Speech or Debate Clause] should not be a shield here.”159 
It is unclear if these specific cautions were on the mind of Senator 
Levin when he identified the addition of the trust and confidence duty as a 
means to upend any potential barriers to prosecution under the Act. The 
Senate hearing’s witness testimony included a discussion of the failure to 
create a positive duty as a potential downfall of the Act.160 The addition of 
the trust and confidence duty may therefore be understood as merely 
targeting the witnesses’ technical concerns that the bill include a duty 
analogous to the duty (such as a fiduciary duty) breached in traditional 
insider trading cases and not their Speech or Debate Clause concerns. In 
either case, the Senator’s statement unequivocally asserted “that there are 
no barriers to prosecuti[on].”161 
 
156 Id. at 27 (opening statement of Sen. Mark Begich, Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs). 
157 Id. at 35 (opening statement of Sen. Claire McCaskill, Member, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs). 
158 See H.R. 1148, The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2011). 
159 Id. at 14 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank). Representative Frank mistakenly referred to the 
Speech or Debate Clause as the “Full Faith and Credit Clause” throughout much of his statement; 
however, Mr. Frank realized and acknowledged his mistake moments later and offered the following 
clarification: “I kept saying ‘Full Faith and Credit.’ I meant ‘Speech and [sic] Debate.’” Committee 
Chairman Spencer Bachus quipped in reply, “We will give you full credit for saying ‘Speech and [sic] 
Debate.’” Id. 
160 See, e.g., Senate Committee Hearing, supra note 153, at 152–53 (statement of John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) (describing the original bill’s 
failure to assign a fiduciary duty to members of Congress). 
161 158 CONG. REC. S141 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
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Committee hearings and floor statements are not the only tools for 
insight into Congress’s view of legislative privilege at the time it passed the 
STOCK Act. For instance, on December 2, 2011—one day after the Senate 
Committee hearing162—the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. 
House of Representatives filed an amicus brief in support of Representative 
Renzi’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.163 The Group’s 
members included Speaker of the House John Boehner, Majority Leader 
Eric Cantor, Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy, Minority Leader Nancy 
Pelosi, and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer.164 The brief argued that the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Renzi threatened the protected privilege of 
nondisclosure under Rayburn.165 This indicates that the same congressional 
leaders that voted for passage of the STOCK Act had distinct knowledge of 
the Rayburn holding and understood the threat posed to it should the 
Supreme Court grant certiorari and then uphold the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Renzi. 
Agency input from the beginning of 2012 is also telling. At a February 
breakfast hosted by the Christian Science Monitor, then-SEC Chairwoman 
Mary Schapiro spoke publicly about the STOCK Act as a positive tool for 
SEC enforcement, but forecasted potential difficulties with enforcement 
due to the Speech or Debate Clause.166 Of the potential roadblock the SEC 
would face as a result of the Speech or Debate Clause, Schapiro said, 
“That’s the Constitution. We can’t ask Congress to fix that.”167 
B. An Opportunity for Arbitrage 
If legislative privilege renders the STOCK Act unenforceable, how is 
it different from any other ineffective law that Congress may pass? 
Consider the following hypothetical168: The 112th Congress, feeling 
political pressure from a populace reeling during an economic downturn, 
passes a law diminishing the salary of its members. The language of the act 
suggests immediate implementation. The passage of the law is universally 
well received, but immediate implementation is undoubtedly 
unconstitutional given the Twenty-Seventh Amendment’s requirement that 
“[n]o law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and 
 
162 Senate Committee Hearing, supra note 153. 
163 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of 
Representatives in Support of Petitioner, Renzi v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (No. 11-557), 
2011 WL 6019914. 
164 Id. at 1, 2011 WL 6019914 at *1. 
165 Id. at 16–19, 2011 WL 6019914 at *16–19. 
166 Peter Schroeder, SEC Head Signs Off on STOCK Act, ON THE MONEY: THE HILL’S FIN. & 
ECON. BLOG (Feb. 22, 2012, 9:23 PM), http://thehill.com/212107-sec-head-signs-off-on-stock-act. 
167 Id. 
168 My thanks to Professor Erin Fielding Delaney for posing this hypothetical. 
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Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall 
have intervened.”169 In effect, Congress passed an ineffective law for a 
short-term political gain that posed no real threat to its ranks. While 
offensive in its pandering,170 the passage of the law does not delegate a new 
task to a separate branch. 
Now consider the STOCK Act, passed in 2012 with broad bipartisan 
support. The STOCK Act does not appear, on its face, unconstitutional. It 
merely delegates authority to the Executive to prosecute members of 
Congress for insider trading. However, if the Speech or Debate Clause 
renders a STOCK Act prosecution or civil proceeding unwinnable, the 
Executive has nevertheless expended time and resources in its pursuit. All 
the while, Congress still reaps the political gain from passage of the Act. In 
effect, Congress as an institution positions the Executive Branch against the 
individual right interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause. By 
delegating authority to the Executive Branch, whether well-intentioned or 
otherwise, the STOCK Act creates a potential problem for the separation of 
powers. 
In order to determine whether the STOCK Act represents 
congressional arbitrage, a more thorough examination of the Act’s teeth in 
light of the Speech or Debate Clause is necessary. Some scholars have 
concluded that the Clause would not pose a hindrance to STOCK Act 
prosecution given the Supreme Court’s treatment of previous information-
sharing acts—such as publishing information in a press release171—as 
nonlegislative acts that are therefore not protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause.172 From this, the scholars conclude that if the conveyance of 
information to third parties is not central to the deliberative process, then 
personal use of information, or the actual trading, “would be even less 
related to the legislative process.”173 This argument recalls the distinction 
made in United States v. Brewster between the acceptance of the bribe (a 
nonlegislative, criminal act) and the performance of the promise (in the 
case of Brewster, the vote for postage-rate legislation, an inherently 
legislative act).174 One scholar cites directly to Brewster to conclude that 
 
169 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. 
170 But see Brachman, supra note 20, at 303 (proposing that the STOCK Act may in time effect 
positive change if only as an “appearance-generating device”). While Brachman recognizes the 
evidentiary challenges posed by the Speech or Debate Clause to the Executive Branch’s enforcement of 
the Act, Brachman does not discuss the legislative manipulation, intentional or not, of the Executive 
Branch in this appearance-generating process. See id. at 293–97. 
171 See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (holding that newsletters and press 
releases are not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause). 
172 See e.g., Barbabella et al., supra note 127, at 218–19. 
173 See id. at 219. 
174 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972). 
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“[j]ust as the Speech [or] Debate Clause does not prohibit members of 
Congress from being prosecuted for accepting bribes, it should not bar 
regulation of congressional insider trading.”175 These sources, however, do 
not consider the role of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rayburn.176 
The flaw in this argument is the failure to consider the evidence 
necessary to build a case for insider trading.177 In Brewster, which dealt 
with the bribery statute, the acceptance of the bribe was both the crime and 
the key evidentiary component of the prosecution, while the legislative act 
was merely an action taken in furtherance of the bribe.178 Dissimilarly, in an 
insider trading case, the actual trading and breach of duty is the crime, but 
the key evidentiary component is the exchange of material, nonpublic 
information. The exchange of information, however, is not inherently 
criminal.179 
Thus, while the actual trading may not be a privileged activity, the 
material, nonpublic information was likely received through a legislative 
act, such as a constituent meeting or a closed-door committee hearing. The 
Supreme Court has treated committee work as a legislative act for the 
purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause,180 and courts and commentators 
have long construed a broad application of the privilege to locations and 
functions beyond speeches on the House or Senate floor.181 In 1808’s Coffin 
v. Coffin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that legislative 
privilege “ought not to be construed strictly” when the court refused to 
limit the privilege’s application merely to speech delivered on the floor of a 
legislative chamber.182 Meanwhile, Justice Story found that the “privilege is 
strictly confined to things done in the course of parliamentary proceedings, 
and does not cover things done beyond the place and limits of duty.”183 Yet, 
Justice Story’s editors later attached a critical footnote following “place” to 
indicate that a place of duty “includes committee rooms and all authorized 
places of meeting.”184 Given the broad definition of a legislative act, 
 
175 Bainbridge, supra note 133, at 303 (footnote omitted) (citing Barbabella et al., supra note 127, 
at 219). 
176 On the other hand, several of the scholars who have considered the Speech or Debate Clause as 
a potential threat to STOCK Act enforcement have at least cited Rayburn to support their conclusions. 
See Nagy, supra note 130, at 1135 n.177; Hamilton et al., supra note 20, at nn.39 & 79. 
177 Hamilton et al., supra note 20; see also Brachman, supra note 20, at 293–97. 
178 See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 526. 
179 See Brachman, supra note 20, at 293–97. 
180 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377–79 (1951) (holding that the Speech or Debate 
Clause applied to a congressional committee investigation). 
181 See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, Congressional Searches and Seizures: The Place of Legislative 
Privilege, 24 J.L. & POL. 271 (2008). 
182 4 Mass. (1 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808). 
183 STORY, supra note 29, § 863, at 329. 
184 STORY, supra note 40, § 866 n.a, at 630. 
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Rayburn’s nondisclosure privilege creates a considerable, if not complete, 
obstacle to gathering evidence of the exchange of material, nonpublic 
information. 
In practice, this translates to depriving the Executive “of its 
investigative and prosecutorial power under Rayburn because it makes 
judicial search warrants practically ineffective by requiring a 
congressman’s consent to execute the search.”185 In a post-Rayburn world, 
the nondisclosure privilege recognized by the D.C. Circuit poses a 
significant hindrance to the SEC or the Justice Department in an effort to 
obtain relevant evidence in a STOCK Act proceeding, but not before the 
Executive will have expended time, manpower, and resources to bring a 
case in the first place. 
The post-Rayburn environment created an arbitrage opportunity out of 
which the STOCK Act was passed. Whether or not Congress intended to 
game the system, the effect of the Act’s passage without waiver will game 
the system. It will leverage Rayburn’s near-bulletproof individual 
guarantee of legislative privilege against an institutional delegation of 
prosecutorial authority understood to apply to all of Congress, and it will 
use the Executive Branch to do so. In United States v. Helstoski, the Court 
noted that excluding the Government’s evidence on the basis of the Speech 
or Debate Clause would “without doubt . . . make prosecutions more 
difficult,” but allowed the exclusion anyway.186 Would the Court have so 
decided if doing so made some prosecutions virtually impossible? 
IV. AN INSTITUTIONAL WAIVER FOR THE STOCK ACT 
Given the STOCK Act’s arbitrage opportunity, a move toward an 
institutional interpretation of legislative privilege would restore an 
appropriate balance to the separation of powers. An institutional 
interpretation would remedy the separation of powers conflict that came to 
life in the STOCK Act by allowing for an institutional waiver of privilege. 
A waiver, in turn, would ease the tension between the Speech or Debate 
Clause’s purpose of preserving the separation of powers and the extreme 
individual interpretation of legislative privilege by the D.C. Circuit as 
articulated in Rayburn. 
An overextension of the individual theory is problematic whether 
Congress had good intentions or not when delegating prosecutorial 
 
185 Green, supra note 126, at 502. Green continues, “Any member trying to evade prosecution for 
criminal activity would logically never consent if such a search would reveal incriminating evidence. 
Thus, if disclosure to, or discovery by, the executive branch alone violates the Clause, members 
effectively enjoy a general exemption from ‘process in Criminal cases,’ which is explicitly barred by 
Gravel.” Id. 
186 442 U.S. 477, 488 (1979). 
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authority to the Executive through the STOCK Act. First, the individual 
theory creates a problem for a Congress intent on holding its offending 
members accountable. By treating legislative privilege as a purely 
individual guarantee, the intent of Congress and those it represents is 
obviated in the name of legislative privilege—a difficult proposition to 
square with Coffin v. Coffin and Justice Story’s construction of legislative 
privilege as a function of popular sovereignty.187 
A legal landscape that only conceives of the individual right all but 
eliminates the possibility of the STOCK Act fulfilling the purpose ascribed 
to it by a well-intentioned Congress. Because the implication of the 
individual theory is that Congress cannot waive legislative privilege on 
behalf of its members,188 it essentially throws the baby out with the 
bathwater: the baby being popular will, accountability, and an effective 
legislative process, and the bathwater being fear of encroachment by an 
Executive Branch forged in the shadow of King George III. 
On the other hand, a cynic’s Congress might have intentionally 
leveraged legislative privilege against its own statute to hold its members 
accountable, while using the Executive for its own political gain. The 
individual right interpretation allows this depiction of an ill-intentioned 
Congress to succeed. It would simultaneously threaten the separation of 
powers and decimate Congress’s political accountability. Therefore, the 
individual theory does not allow for effective handling of a STOCK Act 
passed by either a well-intentioned or ill-intentioned Congress. 
An institutional approach in the case of the STOCK Act, however, will 
balance the scales in the wake of Rayburn. By allowing Congress to waive 
legislative privilege in a particular act, the institutional approach will 
maintain an effective balance of powers between the branches by 
protecting the Executive from potential legislative gaming. In Helstoski, the 
Supreme Court held that the federal bribery statute did not constitute an 
institutional waiver of legislative privilege.189 Assuming arguendo that such 
a waiver was constitutional, the Court concluded that a “waiver could be 
shown only by an explicit and unequivocal expression,” and “[t]here is no 
evidence of such a waiver in the language or the legislative history” of the 
bribery statute.190 Helstoski therefore left the door open for an institutional 
waiver, and the STOCK Act now proves it necessary. 
The best case scenario for a waiver would entail a congressional 
amendment of the STOCK Act to include a clear statement waiving Speech 
or Debate Clause privileges of members and congressional staff prosecuted 
 
187 See supra Part I.A; see also CHAFETZ, supra note 26, at 90–93. 
188 See supra Part I.C. 
189 Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 493. 
190 Id. 
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under the Act. In lieu of a legislative amendment to the Act, a court may 
recognize waiver within the Act under the Helstoski framework, utilizing 
an institutional approach to privilege. If a court were to read in waiver to 
the STOCK Act, it would have to comply with the Helstoski requirement 
that any such waiver be an “explicit and unequivocal expression,”191 despite 
the fact that the text of the STOCK Act nowhere states that members of 
Congress hereby waive the application of their Speech or Debate Clause 
privileges.192 As Professor Bradley suggested in reference to the bribery 
statute, a court may first look to the statute’s express inclusion of members 
of Congress within its scope.193 The STOCK Act states specifically, 
“Members of Congress and employees of Congress are not exempt from 
the insider trading prohibitions arising under the securities laws, including 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5 
thereunder.”194 The inclusion of members of Congress within the Act’s 
intentional scope is certainly explicit and unequivocal. 
Furthermore, the Helstoski Court concluded that there was no 
unequivocal waiver based on the lack of evidence of such a waiver in the 
language or legislative history of the bribery statute.195 The same cannot be 
said for the STOCK Act. The duty imposed on members based on the “trust 
and confidence” owed to the Congress as an institution and to the 
American people signals a binding institutional promise, backed by the 
weight of law (and SEC and Justice Department enforcement).196 As 
Senator Levin stated, this language was intended to respond to concerns 
raised in hearings and bill markup in order to “reassure[] the American 
people that there are no barriers to prosecuting Members and employees of 
Congress for insider trading.”197 Given the extensive discussion of 
legislative privilege in both the Senate and House hearings, one could 
reasonably conclude this language—intended to destroy all barriers to 
prosecution—expresses a strong willingness of Congress to forgo its right 
to legislative privilege in light of its duty to both the institution of Congress 
and the American people. 
Several factors, however, suggest that Congress did not intend to 
institutionally waive legislative privilege when passing the STOCK Act. 
These factors include members’ unflagging defense of the expanded 
privilege under Rayburn as evidenced by the Pelosi–Hastert joint 
 
191 See supra Part II.A. 
192 See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-105, 126 Stat. 
291. 
193 Bradley, supra note 26, at 225. 
194 STOCK Act, § 4(a), 126 Stat. at 292. 
195 See Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 493. 
196 See supra Part III.A.1–2. 
197 158 CONG. REC. S141 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
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statement,198 the high-ranking staffers’ amici brief in opposition to the 
Government’s petition for certiorari in Rayburn,199 and the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group’s amicus brief in support of Representative Renzi’s 
petition for certiorari.200 A court may treat those statements as the 
understanding of legislative privilege that Congress would have had at the 
time of STOCK Act passage—that legislative privilege includes a 
nondisclosure privilege under Rayburn in the District of Columbia—and as 
the rule against which Congress expected the STOCK Act to be enforced. 
Alternatively, members’ awareness of legislative privilege could also play 
in favor of waiver. These same statements establish the knowledge that 
Congress possessed when it nevertheless adopted the unequivocal language 
pertaining to the Act’s scope and purpose. 
The arbitrage opportunity created by the STOCK Act’s passage calls 
for a reexamination of the individual guarantee interpretation of legislative 
privilege. With the separation of powers as its underlying purpose, the 
Speech or Debate Clause is best effectuated through an interpretation of 
legislative privilege as an institutional guarantee. An institutional waiver is 
limited in that it would only apply to the act in which it was created—
specifically, the STOCK Act. Because it would not apply wholesale to all 
potential prosecutions of members of Congress, the institutional waiver 
provides a more measured approach to balancing separation of powers 
concerns than the all-or-nothing approach of the individual theory. An 
institutional approach would allow a politically accountable Congress to 
effectively legislate and hold corrupt members responsible under the 
STOCK Act. The narrow scope of the Act prevents Executive abuse of its 
prosecutorial authority, while an institutional waiver would simultaneously 
prevent the misuse of the Executive Branch by Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, 
members of Congress enjoy an expansive legislative privilege of 
nondisclosure within the District of Columbia. Rayburn is one of the 
broadest interpretations of legislative privilege as an individual guarantee 
to members of Congress. In developing legislative privilege doctrine, 
courts have looked to the threat posed to Congress by limiting legislative 
privilege and the potential danger of allowing for corruption in Congress by 
broadening privilege, but courts have not openly considered the potential 
negative effects of broadening privilege on all of the branches. 
 
198 See supra Part II.B. 
199 See supra Part II.B. 
200 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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The reach of legislative privilege has created an incentive structure 
that allowed Congress to avoid assuming any real risk of criminal or civil 
sanctions while misusing the Executive Branch in its capacity as enforcer 
of the STOCK Act. In order to maintain the separation of powers that the 
Speech or Debate Clause is intended to protect, Congress should amend the 
STOCK Act to explicitly waive legislative privilege or the courts should 
read legislative privilege waiver into the STOCK Act under the 
institutional interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause. Waiver would 
restore a proper balance between the branches and ensure that legislative 
action—and in turn the will of the people—is adequately effected. 
